for-tat regulatory stance is supported by both game theory and civic republican sociological approaches. Responsive Regulation developed a principled way for regulators to choose between punishment and persuasion, recognizing that neither approach works all the time. Consider also the concepts of "multiple selves" and multiple registers of action; the relationship that Responsive Regulation describes between regulation and other forces, be they public interest groups (PIGs) or other actors contributing to the "license to operate" (Gunningham et. al. 2003) ; and above all the embrace of contestability and revisability. Responsive Regulation's insistence on pragmatic, context-sensitive application and continual evolution is an important commitment given the complexity and uncertainty that characterizes so many regulatory environments today.
Responsive Regulation develops a theoretical model that is meant to apply to a broad range of contexts. It makes a large claim, even while recognizing that the significance of the theory can be assessed only "through praxis in concrete institutional arenas" (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 99) . In that spirit, our recent shared experience of the financial crisis may illuminate aspects of Responsive Regulation that might otherwise have gone unremarked. Twenty years on and with the benefit of this hard experience, two aspects of Responsive Regulation are striking. The first is the direct, personal relationship on which the regulatory interaction is premised. The second is the boundedness and manageability of the regulatory project. Regulators are understood to know what behaviors constitute compliance and non-compliance, to be able to interpret accurately signals from industry, and to be able to calibrate appropriate responses. At least in prudential regulation of global financial institutions in the wake of the recent financial crisis (though surely elsewhere too), neither the ongoing faceto-face relationship nor the boundedness or knowability of the regulatory terrain can be taken for granted.
This brief essay seeks to open a preliminary conversation about Responsive
Regulation in terms of its scalability. It considers whether as a practical matter, Responsive Regulation can be scaled up to more diffuse, multiparty, logistically complex contexts, such as financial regulation. While the theory aspires to general applicability, it is grounded in empirical work in a particular kind of regulatory environment, meaning that it may be less applicable in others. As a matter of representation, the essay asks whether by projecting the focal object, the responsive relationship, outward, Responsive Regulation distorts our image of regulation in other contexts. In doing so, the inquiry inevitably reflects back on Responsive Regulation's own home environment, where the question is whether Responsive Regulation also oversimplifies the complexity and challenges inherent in the interpersonal relationship itself. The essay closes by arguing that in order to incorporate responsive regulation's considerable discursive and relational benefits into regulatory environments such as global financial regulation, it needs to be buttressed by additional regulatory technologies.
1

The Roots of Responsive Regulation
Responsive Regulation puts forward a personal, and interpersonally-based, perspective. Some of the book's deepest roots, on John Braithwaite's side, are with subject areas such as coal mine safety, or patient care in the nursing home industry.
Accounts and interview excerpts derived from these environments give the book much of its narrative force. These are environments characterized by direct, face-toface interactions between regulators and regulated actors. The fact that industry actors must be licensed ab initio generates an essentially finite and knowable pool of participants. Regulated actors are also geographically embedded, in spaces such as coal mines and nursing homes, the physical condition of which is one of the things regulators are concerned about. The way to examine such institutions is to physically visit them. The context that orients Responsive Regulation is the personal nexus between compliance officer, supervisor, enforcement staffer, and management and workers.
In addition to being personal and face-to-face, responsive regulation is interpersonal, meaning that the quality and nature of the human relationship undergirding regulation is of primary concern. The enforcement and regulatory pyramids are institutional features built outward from a series of human interactions over time, not from organization-level design concerns. The orientation toward the interpersonal has only increased over the last twenty years. The conceptual link between the responsive regulatory ideal and John Braithwaite's restorative justice work (e.g., Braithwaite 1989), which is also rooted in personal relationships (e.g., Braithwaite 2002), is increasingly strong and central. The interpersonal orientation makes responsive regulation a rich perspective in a field, regulation, which tends sometimes to revolve around more theoretical or structural accounts. The level of so-called mundane human engagement has great positive and normative significance, of course. As behavioral psychologists and others have forcefully demonstrated in the years since Responsive Regulation was published, we ignore the interpersonal at our peril.
2 The interpersonal orientation is also the source of the book's great dynamism and context-sensitivity. From it flow its important insights around tailoring regulation to particular actors, accessing situational knowledge, and permitting flexible regulation through the mechanism of enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 101-132 anticipates subsequent work on the value of incremental problem-solving as a mechanism for regulatory policy-making. 4 Ayres and Braithwaite envision an incremental accretion of well-designed and participation-enhancing regulatory moments -such as giving real powers to relevant PIGs within tripartite discursive structures -ultimately to be constitutive of a republican political order that emphasizes direct participation in the regulatory moment, often at a very local level, in the service of citizen empowerment and a thicker, more engaging account of citizenship (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 17-18) .
In thinking about what Responsive Regulation can contribute to the financial regulatory arena, the question may be the degree to which one of its essential elements, the direct interpersonal relationship as a basis of knowledge and action, is scalable to the kinds of contexts that concern us in financial regulation.
Regulation and Scale
What The concept of scalability assumes that there are different scales that are of concern to us. This much seems clear, although we could define scale in terms of any number of metrics including the geographic, organizational, technical, or product-oriented.
5
Because the core operative mechanism in Responsive Regulation is the direct, interpersonal relationship between regulator and regulated entity, the relevant technical question is whether and how well responsive regulation functions when the relationships in question move from one-to-one, to many-to-many. 6 The kind of scaling up we are concerned with is scaling up from a context where an inspector is engaged in a direct relationship with an inspected party, in relation to a bounded physical space, around a relatively straightforward set of regulatory compliance criteria -to contexts characterized by multiparty, attenuated, or disintermediated relationships, a larger and perhaps less clearly delineated regulatory space (in terms of scope, but also in the move from enforcement/compliance to prospective rulemaking), and a more logistically complex or contested set of regulatory compliance criteria.
In addition to being a technical measure, scale is also a conceptual. In a classic article from 25 years ago, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1987) defined a conception of scale in law, by drawing an analogy between cartography and law. He claimed that "the relations law entertains with social reality are much similar to those between maps and spatial reality. Indeed, laws are maps …" (de Sousa Santos 1987, p. 282).
Because maps cannot represent all features of the real world with perfect accuracy or they would have to be the size and shape of the real world, maps distort reality through three mechanisms: scale, projection, and symbolisation. This essay is most concerned with the first two. 7 Speaking representationally, as de Sousa Santos does, scale is a function of size relative to the phenomenon to be mapped. As scale increases, that is the model tries to encompass a larger area, the representation of detail must decrease. 8 Because maps are "a miniaturized version of reality, mapmaking involves the filtering of details, the selection of both meaningful details and relevant features" (de Sousa Santos 1987, p. 283) . Whether a map is useful for a particular purpose depends on whether the details that have been selected are appropriate for those purposes.
De Sousa Santos describes projection in map-making as referring to the distortions that have to be built in, in order to represent a round globe on a flat piece of paper. Cartographers can choose different ways to distort the globe. They can trade off overlarge poles and undersized equators, or choose to depict distance accurately at the expense of depicting area accurately. Which compromises are most acceptable will depend on the purpose to which the map is put. Crucially for our purposes, projection and distortion also happen outward from a focal object or concern. As de Sousa Santos (1987, p. 285) says, "each map, each historical period or each cultural tradition of map-making has a centre, a fixed point, a physic or symbolic space in a privileged position around which the diversity, the direction, and the meaning of other spaces is organized". Whether the distortion of reality that inevitably accompanies cartography does or does not entail a "distortion of truth", as de Sousa Santos (1987, p. 282) puts it, is a function of the means by which scale, projection, and symbolisation are deployed.
For de Sousa Santos, the hermeneutic tools of scale and projection are useful for understanding law. Using examples from his empirical work around "revolutionary legality" in Portugal, property rights in Brazil, and popular courts in the Cape Verde Islands, de Sousa Santos claims that particular accounts are only coherent at particular scales. Although different scale level accounts interact, and particular social events can amount simultaneously to "legal events" at more than one scale level, the legal accounts created at the different levels -in terms of motivations, actors, central issues -are not equivalent.
The same point can be made in financial regulation. At the small scale regulators could be concerned with investigating a particular financial institution for subprime mortgage fraud (Freiden 2004) . This is the kind of factual scenario in which the
Responsive Regulation account makes intuitive sense, even if regulators are not inspecting a physical plant. They are inspecting physical documents and speaking to those involved in creating them. Moving to a higher scale, regulators could be concerned with the various steps through which a defined group of financial institutions in a particular country transformed those subprime mortgages into triple-A rated securities, and marketed them. Moving to a still higher scale, regulators are confronted with the relationships between the marketing of those instruments and effects such as global systemic risk, system effects, interconnectedness, and the magnitude and impact of the over-the-counter derivatives market (see, e.g., Schwarcz Extrapolating from de Sousa Santos, we might say that some conceptual constructs are defined (explicitly or implicitly) in terms of a particular scale, and only come into focus at that scale. Examples would include ecosystem-based environmental law, or the tragedy of the commons -a phenomenon that can only affect those that have a commons in common. Certain phenomena -a the law of large numbers in statistics, or herd immunity in epidemiology -are so contingent on achieving a particular scale level that their necessary preconditions are not present at other (in these examples, lower) levels. James Madison was making a scale argument when he said that freedom from oppression required a republic of a certain minimum size. 9 Systemic risk, system effects, and groupthink also depend to some degree on achieving a particular scale. Where they are present, they exert a considerable effect. Models embedded within other scales, which cannot "see" system effects, will miss an important feature of the regulatory landscape.
Similarly, if the truth of an assertion depends on a scale precondition, then claims that seem to make sense at one level may seem incoherent at another. Lawrence
Cunningham (2007) critiques the "rhetoric" of principles-based securities regulation on this basis. He argues that individual statutory provisions may be more rules-based or principles-based, but that the language is meaningless when used to describe entire regulatory regimes (but see Ford 2010, p. 265 though beyond this paper's scope -but the point here is that the consequential and signaling functions on which the model depends are even harder to generate when one moves from a one-to-one relationship to more complex, "noisier" environments.
These would include one-to-many relationships, many-to-many relationships, or contexts where one party takes more than one move during its turn, and so cannot interpret exactly what provoked the regulatory response it receives.
The various accounts generated through scale functions are neither operatively nor normatively neutral. Precisely how the legal accounts are drawn at different scale levels is deeply constitutive of the social event itself (de Sousa Santos 1987, p. 288) .
Moreover, like the focal concern on a map, the central legal concerns will ramify outward: Scale, then, is both quantitative and qualitative. Talking about the general scalability of regulation is too vague to be helpful. We may be concerned simply about whether a system is operationally scalable at all (and it may be that some elements of some models are not). Yet we will also be concerned about whether the model scales up, while preserving attributes we particularly care about -its efficiency, stability, transparency, flexibility, responsiveness, or democratic representativeness. Taking steps to boost the scalability of a particular aspect of a model may negatively affect the scalability of other aspects. Assessing the "fit" of a particular model in relation to the regulatory problem at hand requires that we make normative choices and establish priorities, ex ante.
As Elinor Ostrom has identified, different functions are best accomplished at different scales. In a world of finite resources, imperfect information, and self-interested action, no single method can be ideally effective across all scales (Ostrom 1990 point here is that, even if we assume a high degree of congruence between responsive regulatory theory and real life experience in the theory's home environments, we cannot assume that responsive regulation will automatically scale upward into the highly fluid, mutable, and dynamic scale at which global financial regulation operates.
The example below seeks to illustrate this point. The final section of the essay considers options that may permit the nature of the knowledge generated in the responsive regulatory relationship scale up, even if the relationships themselves do not.
Basel II as a scale problem for enforced selfregulation
Relative to the command-and-control literature that preceded it, responsive regulation represents an intentional move toward a more sophisticated, multi-level regulatory approach. Responsive regulation recognizes that a lot of information is best gathered in a decentralized, firm-level manner and that knowledge about the particular risks associated with a particular line of business should also be drawn upward to the regulatory level. Though Ayres and Braithwaite do not frame it in these terms, one could think of the enforcement pyramid as a compliance-into-regulation scaling tool, designed to locate discrete regulatory interactions within a broader conceptual matrix and to aggregate them into a comprehensive regulatory stance. Tripartism, also, implicitly recognizes that there are interested parties operating at the interstitial layer of "civil society" (as it then was called), who could be brought into the regulatory Let us now consider the assumptions and core preoccupations of enforced selfregulation. Fundamental to responsive regulatory strategies such as enforced selfregulation is, first, the assumption that regulated actors (here, "firms") are rational, autonomous and coherent enough to know how they are conducting themselves internally, and to behave in their own self-interest. Like other game theoretic models, tit-for-tat would make no sense if a regulator did not have a rational counterparty to around the notion that the regulator/firm relationship is the primary locus where important things happen. This is the rationale behind the tripartism prescription.
Tripartism assumes that the main way to give voice and effect to other, civil society priorities is to make them part of that conversation.
What actually took place around prudential regulation of global financial institutions under Basel II (and the CSE Program) was quite different, and in a sense can be understood as problems of scale. Finance today is global, electronic, fast-moving, and based on esoteric knowledge in a way that pulls it away significantly from regulation of physically embedded and static regulated actors. The first assumption above -that firms are rational, autonomous, and coherent enough to behave in their own selfinterest -was disproved in part as a function of scale. Firms' capacity to know,
internally, exactly what risks they were running was severely limited by their heavy reliance on software to handle the extraordinarily complex assets, products, and markets they were dealing with (Schwarcz 2009 There was also a structural scale problem that contributed: in the United States, where the worst problems occurred, the Basel II structure was incorporated into the CSE Program on a voluntary basis because no American regulator had the authority to impose capital adequacy requirements on global shadow banks (SEC 2008, p. 81) . cascade toward excessive risk-taking. Focusing on the regulator/firm relationship misapprehends the economic and collective scale at which problems were building.
To the extent that Responsive Regulation is organized around the three assumptions above, and especially on the presence of an interpersonal regulator-firm relationship as a basis for knowledge, it is incapable of speaking to the circumstances surrounding Basel II. Because interpersonal and knowledge-generating relationships are at the centre of the enforced self-regulation conceptual map, it would be a costly mistake -a distortion of truth, in de Sousa Santos's terms (1987, p. 282) -to apply the model upward through scales without reflecting on whether it still adequately represented the most salient facts, and whether it was still congruent with regulatory concerns and priorities that came into view at a different scale. Making enforced self-regulation relevant and meaningful at a wholly different scale requires that we find ways to scale the model up, past the reach of interpersonal relationships. 13 Moreover, we will want to do so without losing whatever it is that we think is most essential about responsive regulation itself. While distortions and trade-offs will be inevitable as we move through scales, we can make choices about what we most care about accurately projecting upward.
Where do we go from here? Responses
The precise kinds of relationships on which Responsive Regulation is founded probably cannot be scaled upward without incurring excessive costs. They would be if we committed to a direct supervisory relationship all the way up, through national and information that responsive regulation generates -incremental, contextual, experiential, and collaboratively generated.
There are two main options in trying to make responsive regulation function at higher scales. The first is to reduce the demands imposed on the responsive regulatory system, by limiting the scale, scope, or logistical complexity of the environment in some way. Computer systems designers know that systems are more scalable if they do less for each user. What, then, is the minimum that the (responsive) regulatory system must do (in order to still be responsive)? Risk-based approaches, which try to allocate regulatory resources to the most high risk contexts, may be helpful in this regard (e.g., Black 2005; but see Gunningham 2011, p. 9) . We may also want to consider the selective use of prophylactic or default rules (e.g., Dorf and Sabel 1998),
for the purpose of containing complexity and limiting explicit variability. 14 Bright line capital adequacy requirements are such a tool, and form part of the new Basel III Accord in the forms of leverage ratios, mandatory capital conservation buffers, and similar measures (Basel III). Routinization and standardization can also be scaling mechanisms, because by holding some elements stable they create a platform on which diverse approaches can interact (Simon 2011) . Ironically, it was in fact a standardized contract for purchase and sale, the ISDA Master Agreement, which permitted the over-the-counter derivatives market to grow to the extent and in the diversity that it did (Jomadar 2007) . Where and how risk assessments, standardization, and prophylactic rules are embedded is a value-laden choice.
Additionally, as Annelise Riles has observed in describing the "agency" of tools, forms and technique are contested and highly consequential (2011, p. 229 ). Yet carefully applied, these techniques may play an important role in corralling the regulatory project within manageable bounds.
The second option would be to try to boost responsive regulation's capacity at higher scales. We have fewer real-life examples to look to here, though scholars have contributed proposals. For example, creating a centralized standard-setting and information-processing clearinghouse to aggregate information and coordinate more localized regulatory engagements could help transform small-scale, discrete regulatory moments into something more systemic (e.g., Dorf and Sabel 1998, p. 287-89, 354-56) . Institutionalized "learning loops" and the meta-regulatory notion of "regulating self-regulation" are another possibility (Parker 2002 
